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ADMIRALTY-SALVAGE-OWNER OF CARGO CANNOT COLLECT DAMAGES FROM
SALVAGED VEssEL.-Cargo carried on a salving vessel was greatly damaged by the
delay caused by the salvage service. The bill of lading precluded any claim against
the carrier for loss caused by a salvage enterprise. The owner of the cargo
libelled the salvaged vessel for damages. Held, that the libel be dismissed. Swift
& Co. v. Menoninee (Jan. 30, 1924) S. D. N. Y. Oct. Term, 1923. (Not yet
reported.)
A vessel which has conferred salvage service is entitled to compensation covering
labor expended, risk incurred, and a reward. The Jelling (1918, E. D. N. C.) 253
Fed. 381; The Nord Alexis (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 273 Fed. 16o. Originally, the
award could be claimed only by one who had rendered voluntary personal service.
The Jack Jewett (1868, S. D. N. Y.) Fed. Cas. No. 7,122. A shipowner may
now base his claim on services rendered by his ship. The Lewis Brothers (1923,
S. D. Fla.) 287 Fed. 143. Or merely on the risk of loss. The Johnson Lighterage
Co. (1918, C. C. A. 3d) 248 Fed. 74 (owner of a chartered ship). However, the
salving crew or passenger must still show hazardous personal services. The
Johnson Lighterage Co., supra. And this has been applied to a cargo owner. The
Brixham (1893, E. D. Va.) 54 Fed. 539; The Persian Monarch (1884,
E. D. N. Y.) 23 Fed. 82o. He is therefore usually left to his remedy against the
shipowner for damages to his cargo. The Nathaniel Hopper (1839, D. Mass.) Fed.
Cas. No. 10,032. But he may also make himself co-salror by consenting to the sal-
vage enterprise and thus absolving the shipowner from liability. Mason v. Blaireau
(1804, U. S.) 2 Cranch, 24o. To absolve the shipowner by a mere bill of lading
has been held to prevent the cargo owner from claiming an interest in the salvage
award. The Dupuy de Lome (1893, E. D. La.) 55 Fed. 93. But it seems that this
might be regarded as previous consent to any salvage enterprise. In any case, it
is probably sound policy to refuse the cargo owner more than compensation for
losses actually sustained. Compagnie Coimnerciale v. Charente Steamship Co.
(1893, C. C. A. 5th) 6o Fed. 921. But even if the bill of lading lessens the
damage claim of the salving ship, the cargo owner should be allowed to claim
directly from the salvaged ship such damage as the cargo actually suffered through
the salving operations. The Colo (1878, S. D. N. Y.) Fed. Cas. No. 3,024.
BANKS AND BANKING--LIEN OF BANK ON DEPosITs OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER.-
The X company, a firm of commission merchants, purchased as the defendant's
agents a carload of cattle, received the defendant's check to its order for the
price including commissions, deposited it with the plaintiff bank, and gave the
seller its own check for the price. The bank credited the company with the
deposit and charged an overdraft and a demand note against it. It subsequently
dishonored the company's check when presented by the seller for payment. The
company informed the plaintiff of its agency and it still refused to honor the check.
The company notified the defendant, who stopped payment on his check, paying
the seller in cash for the cattle. In a suit by the bank on the check, the jury
made a general finding for the defendant. Held, that the judgment on the
verdict be affirmed. Southwest National Bank v. Evans (1923, Okla.) 221
Pac. 53.
The instant case is decided on the ground that, either as a matter of law, or
as a question of fact settled by general verdict, the plaintiff bank had notice of
the X company's interest in the check from the nature of its business. Union
Stockyards Bank v. Gillespie (189o) 137 U. S. 411, 1i Sup. Ct. ii8. But the
result would probably have been the same in the absence of notice. Although
cash deposits of the customer received bona fide and without notice are subject,
regardless of ownership, to a banker's lien, the tendency in the United States
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to regard the lien as a mere right to set off against the depositor the sums due
from him is partly responsible for placing deposits of negotiable paper on a
different footing. Furber v. Dane (19o) 203 Mass. io8, 89 N. E. 227; 12
A. L. R. lO48, note; I Morse, Banks and Banking (5th ed. 1917) secs. 324-5.
Where the crediting by the bank of paper indorsed in blank or for collection
and credit is held a sale of the paper, the bank should be regarded as a holder
for value at least to the extent of the customer's existing indebtedness, and if
the bank is also a holder in due course, the paper should to the extent of its
interest be discharged of equities in others. Ex parle Richdale (1881) L. R. ig
Ch. 409 (holding the bank a full holder for value) ; see Scott, Cases on Trusts
(igig) 64, note. But the American cases still require a change of position on
the faith of the "purchase." Union National Bank v. Winsor (1907) IOI Minn.
470, 112 N. W. 999; 6 A. L. R. 252, note; contra: Williamson Bank v. Miles
(914) 113 Ark. 342, 169 S. W. 368. Paper indorsed for collection usually makes
the bank a trustee and-as opposed to "for collection and remittance"-with the
privilege, if without notice of equities in others, of changing its position to that of
debtor upon collection. Evansville Bank v. Gernzan-American Bank (1895) 155
U. S. 556, I5 Sup. Ct. 221; 24 A. L. R. 1148, note. And the relation of debtor
and creditor after the paper is cashed, seems generally to cut off the rights of
others therein. Wood v. Bank (i88o) 129 Mass. 358; Kiinmel v. Bean (19o4)
68 Kan. 598, 75 Pac. 118; see Bank of the Metropolis v. N. E. Bank (1848, U. S.)
6 How. 212 (additional change of position required but merely allowing a
balance against the debtor to remain uncollected held sufficient) ; contra: Law-
rence v. Bank (1827) 6 Conn. 521; see III Am. St. Rep. 407, note; L. R. A.
1915 A, 715, note. Advances made on the faith of the paper before collection
constitute the bank a pledgee or mortgagee and a holder for value to the extent
of the advances. Old National Bank v. Gibson (1919) 105 Wash. 578, 179 Pac.
117; see COMMENTS (1924) 33 YA.LE LAw JoURNAL, 628. The English authori-
ties not only carry the sale theory to its logical conclusion, but take it for granted
that even a bank holding for collection is a lienholder to the extent of its balance
against the depositor. Ex parte Richdale, supra; Giles v. Perkins (18o9, K. B.)
9 East, ii; Paget, The Law of Banking (3d ed. 1922) 335, 4O1-7. Thus section
27 (3) of the Bills of Exchange Act which constitutes a lienholder of commercial
paper a holder for value to the extent of his lien, means in this respect far more
than the identically worded corresponding section 27 of the N. I. L. And, if the
purpose of the banker's lien is to facilitate and strengthen the extension of credit
by allowing the bank to rely in law on its expectancy of security in future
deposits, it seems that the English view adopts the better commercial practice.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-GARNISHMENT OF ENEMY PROPEaTY-"SITUS" OF MONEY
DUE ON INSURANCE PoLICIES.-The plaintiff, a New York corporation, was
indebted to German nationals on policies of life insurance issued in England before
the war, and made payable in England. The English Public Trustee claimed to
be entitled to recover from the plaintiff certain charges on enemy property, treating
the debts due the German nationals as such property in the hands of the plaintiff.
The insurance company sought a declaratory judgment that the policies were not
subject to the charge. From a judgment for the insurance company, the defen-
dant appealed. Held, that the policies were subject to the charge. New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee (1924, C. A.) 4o T. L. R. 43o.
A debt can have no physical situs. See Beale, The Exercise of .Twisdiction in
Rein to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 HAxv. L. REv. 1O7; Carpenter,
Jurisdiction over Debts (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 905, gg. Any state having
physical control over the debtor or his property can allow the "debt" to be
garnished. It is generally agreed that this power may be exercised where both
the garnishee and principal defendant are personally served. McShane v. Knox
(i9o8) 1O3 Minn. 268, 114 N. W. 955; Beale, op. cit. supra. And by the majority
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rule where suit is brought at the garnishee's domicile without personal service on
the principal defendant. Swiss Bank Corporation v. Bhnzische Industrial Bank
-(1923, C. A.) 67 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 423; Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. v. Sturm
(1899) 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797 (adjudication of state court entitled to full
faith and credit) ; 67 L. R. A. 209, note; 3 L. P. A. (N. s.) 6o8, note; contra:
Central of Georgia Ry. v. Brinson (189) 1O9 Ga. 354, 34 S. E. 597; see Ballard v.
Chaffee (igoo) 61 Neb. 83, 84 N. W. 6o4 (debt expressly made payable at credi-
tor's domicile). And in the United States, as to debts contracted here, wherever
the garnishee is personally served, irrespective of his domicile. Harris v. Balk
(1905) 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625; see COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 252. It is still unsettled whether the latter rule will be followed if the
garnished debt is contracted or payable in foreign countries. In England garnish-
ment of a debt contracted in Germany and due to the principal defendant from a
foreign corporation served in England has been denied. Martin v. Nadel (I9O6,
C. A.) 2 K. B. 26. It does not seem possible to form any generalization as to
wlen garnishment of debts should be permitted, other than that garnishment
should be allowed in a forum which has a substantial connection with the debt
garnished. Cf, Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts (1921) 30 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 673. The place of payment seems especially important in determining
the substantiality of the forum's connection. Cf. Rouquette v. Overinann (1875)
L. R IO Q. B. 525; Greenwald & Co. v. Kaster (1878) 86 Pa.. 45. Applying the
generalization suggested, the result of the principal case seems sound in that the
debts were both contracted and payable in England. It is to be noted that except
where the force of a superstate, as of the United States under the full faith and
credit clause, will be exerted in the particular instance, there is no assurance that
the adjudication in respect to the debt owed to the principal defendant by the
garnishee will be respected in other jurisdictions. Cf. Ward v. Boyce (1897) 152
N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. i8o; Harris v. Balk, supra.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-DEcENT AND DismtIBUTIoN-EFIECr OF BIGAMOUS
MARRIAGE ON STATUTORY RIGHT OF INHERITANC.-The plaintiff abandoned her
husband and contracted a bigamous marriage. On her husband's death she claimed
half of his property "under Okla. Rev. Laws, I9io, secs. 8417 and 8418, which
made her an heir. The defendant, the other statutory heir, resisted her claim on
the ground that the plaintiff's conduct had precluded her from any share. The
district court found for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. Held, (two
judges dissenting) that the judgment be reversed. Cox v. Cox (1923, Okla.) 217
Pac. 493.
At common law, adultery of a wife barred her right to dower. Statute West-
minster II (1285) 13 Edw. I, c. 34. This principle has been embodied expressly or
by construction in the law of many states. 5 Ann. Cas. 23o, note; I Bishop,
Marriage, Divorce, and Separation (1891) sec. 1520. It is not expressed in the
statute involved in the instant case; and the dissenting judges argued that although
the wife takes as an heir under the statute, she takes because of the fact that she
is a wife, and hence her right is similar to her dower right at common law. See
also Daniels v. Taylor (19o6, C. C. A. 8th) 145 Fed. 169; (1923) 8 MINN. L.
REv. 66. But where, as in the instant case, dower is expressly abolished and the
wife's interest is entirely statutory, it is not subject to any common law
principle. Davis v. Davis (IgIS) 167 Wis. 328, 167 N. W. 819; see Estes v.
Merrill (1915) 121 Ark, 361, 181 S. W. 136. So, in the absence of express 
quali-
fication by statute, even the principle that "one shall not profit by his own wrong"
does not preclude a murderer from inheriting from his victim. McAllister v. Fair
(19o6) 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112; contra: Riggs v. Palier (1889) II5 N. Y. 5o6,
22 N. E. 188 (devisee, not statutory heir); L. K. A. 1915 C, 328, note. And
there is no equitable estoppel in the instant case since there is no element of
reliance on the plaintiff's conduct. De France v. Johnson (1886, C. C. D. Minn.)
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26 Fed. 891. Statutory abolition of dower seems commercially desirable as remov-
ing a hindrance to the transfer of real estate; and the unethical result of the
instant case is avoided where the substance of the statute of Westminster II has
been embodied as a qualification of the statutory right to property given the wife
in lieu of dower. Kantor v. Bloom (ig6) go Conn. 21o, 96 AtI. 974; Morello v.
Cantalupo (ig2o) gI N. J. Eq. 415, Ill Atl. 255.
INTERPLEADER-APPLICANT DENYING LIABILITY CANNOT INTERPLEAD.-The
defendant had executed a surety bond against injury from public vehicles operated
by one Smith. The plaintiffs, who were injured, sued for the whole amount of the
bond although they had recovered damages from the owners of the vehicle. The
defendant denied liability to the plaintiffs and sought to interplead the other
claimants on the bond. The lower court held that the defendant was not liable
on the bond and disregarded the request for an interpleader. The plaintiffs
appealed. Held, that the defendant was liable on the bond but that the interpleader
be refused. Stusser v. Mutual Ins. Co. (1923, Wash.) 221 Pac. 331.
Interpleader is historically an equitable remedy for one who has incurred a
single liability but is threatened with a multiplicity of suits by conflicting
claimants. NOTES (1909) 22 HARv. L. REv. 294. Under modern statutes it is
granted by courts of law, but generally subject to its historical limitations.
Commercial Savings Bank v. Bailey (192o) 18 Ala. App. 30, go So. 48; Chafee,
Modernizing Interpleader (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 814. Where a defen-
dant admits the exact liability claimed, he may withdraw from the suit and substi-
tute the claimants, provided he is reasonably uncertain as to their relative merits.
Conner v. Bank of Bakersfield (1920) 183 Calif. igg, igo Pac. 8oI; Willia4ns v.
Simon (192i, Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. W. 257. And free from independent liability
toward any one of them. Young vz. Colyear (1921) 54 Calif. App. 232, 201 Pac.
623; Sewanee Fitel v. Leonard (1918) 139 Tenn. 648, 202 S. W. 928. But where
the extent of his liability is in controversy, he may not withdraw. Montpelier v.
Capital Savings Bank (1903) 75 Vt. 433, 56 Atl. 89. Where the issue of the
extent of liability may be settled without an accounting, the majority of courts
deny the interpleader, since at law a plaintiff cannot be forced to sue other than
necessary parties. Maxim v. Shotwell (192o) 2o9 Mich. 79, 176 N. W. 414;
Browt v. Arbogast (1914, ist Dept.) 162 App. Div. 6o3, 147 N. Y. Supp. 998.
Otherwise where an accounting is necessary since all interested parties must be
before the court. Guaranteed State Bank v. D'Yariett (1918) 67 Okla. 164, 169
Pac. 639; Hayward v. McDonald (i912, C. C. A. 5th) 192 Fed. 89o. And there
is a modem tendency to grant relief wherever the inequitable element of double
vexation for a single liability is present, even though the amount in controversy
can be settled at law. Security State Bank v. Melchert (1923, Mont.) 216 Pac.
340; Supreme Lodge v. Stapf (ig6, Sup. Ct., Spec. T.) 16o N. Y. 
Supp. lO51.
But where, as in the instant case, the applicant denies liability to the plaintiff, the
conflicting rights of the claimants are not involved, and there is no need for
requiring them to interplead. Stevens v. Robinson (922, N. J. Eq.) 118 AtI. 273.
LEGAL ETHICS-UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT-CRAMMING APPLICANTS FOR ADmIS-
SION TO THE BcA.-An attorney was conducting courses for bar applicants, which
were confined solely to cramming the students with definitions and brief 
statements
of legal principles, unsupported by training in reasoning, or analysis of facts or the
application of the law to the facts. As a result students were able to pass the 
bar
examinations though unfitted by experience, training, and study to be members 
of
the bar. The relator brought an information tor disbar the attorney. Held, (two
judges dissenting) that the information be dismissed as the attorney was 
not
guilty of professional misconduct warranting disciplinary measures. People, ex rel.
Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Baker (1924, Ill.) I42 N. E. 554.
The courts have found it impractical to penalize an attorney for a breach 
of
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good taste or of a tradition of the profession. Sexual immorality has been held no
ground for court discipline. People, ex rel. Black, v. Smith (1919) 290 Ill. 241,
124 N. E. 8o7; 9 A. L. R. i89, note. Or intoxication. In re Elliott (i9o6) 73
Kan. 151, 84 Pac. 75o. A contract for a contingent fee of 5o% of the recovery
has been held not of itself ground for suspension. Grievance Committee v. Ennis
(1911) 84 Conn. 595, 8o Atl. 767. Similarly where business was procured from
a client by the exertion of political pressure. In re Lauterbach (1915, ist Dept.)
169 App. Div. 534, 155 N. Y. Supp. 478. Or even where counsel for the defen-
dant in a criminal prosecution appeared for the plaintiff in a civil action based on
the same cause of action. In re Wilierth (igig) 42 S. D. 76, 172 N. W. 921. It
does not follow, however, any more than with the ordinary citizen, that decency
and ethics permit an attorney to go to the limit of his strict legal privilege. Thus
the propriety of insisting on ultra-technical defenses is often questionable. Leavitt,
Lawyer and Client (191o) 55. Similarly when an attorney appears for an
accused with a knowledge of or belief in his guilt. See (1922) 8 A. B. A. Joua.
166. Or when unduly severe cross examination is indulged in. See Purcell,
Forty Years at the Criminal Bar (1916) 169. In the instant case the attorney
assisted students in meeting the legal requirements and standards for admission
to the bar, and probably should not be punished by the court for not attempting to
maintain a higher standard. This does not, however, mean that his conduct was
"professional." Ethical conduct is more than conduct free from liability to
discipline by the courts. Fortunately professional success or distinction is rarely
attained by one held in disrepute by his fellow citizens and fellow members of
the bar. A strong practical inducement is thus furnished for endeavoring to attain
the highest standard of professional conduct.
NEGLIGENcE-INFANTS-DUTY TO ANTICIPATE CAPRICIOUS Acrs.-The defen-
dant's servant, while driving a truck in the course of his employment, saw two
very young children playing on an embankment near the highway. One suddenly
attempted to cross the street and was run over. The trial court instructed the
jury that the driver owed no duty to the child until the latter was seen or ought to
have been seen approaching danger. Held, that the judgment be reversed, since the
driver was under a duty'to anticipate the capricious act of the child. (1924, Ky.)
Craig's Adm'r v. Bannon Pipe Co., Jefferson Circuit Ct. Com. Pleas Branch, 2d
Div.
The capricious intervening act of a child is often held insufficient to break the
chain of causation. Lane v. Atlantic Works (1872) III Mass. 136; Akin v.
Bradley Engineering Co. (1907) 48 Wash. 97, 92 Pac. 9o3. One who sells a toy
gun or cartridges to a small child is responsible for injury resulting from the
child's thoughtless act. Binford v. Johnston (1882) 82 Ind. 426. Similarly, in the
turn-table cases. Stout v. Sioux City & P. R. Co. (1873, U. S.) 17 Wall. 657;
see (1922) 32 Y.E LAW JOURNAL, 200. And it is universally recognized that
when the child is on the highway, a driver owes a duty to anticipate heedless acts.
Albert v. Mi nch (1917) 141 La. 686, 75 So. 513; Silberstein v. Showell, Fryor
Co. (1920) 267 Pa. 298, 109 Atl. 701. 'He is not justified in assuming that the
child will hear and appreciate a warning. Herald v. Smiith (1920) 56 Utah, 3o4,
19o Pac. 932. In some jurisdictions when the child is seen playing near the
highway, there is a duty to foresee such acts. Mulhern v. Phila. Bread Co. (1917)
257 Pa. 22, IOI Atl. 74; Lederer, Adm'r v. Conn. Ca. (1920) 95 Conn. 520, III
Atl. 785. Especially, where there is a group of children. Clark v. Blair (1914)
217 Mass. 179, 1O4 N. E. 435; Bulger v. Olataka (192o) III Wash. 646, 191 Pac.
786. Other courts require some act indicating an intent to come on the highway.
Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co. (1899) 64 N. J. L. IO, 44 AUt. 964; Borland
v. Lens (1923, Iowa) 194 N. W. 215; see Reaves v. Maybank (1915) 193 Ala.
614, 623, 69 So. 137, 14o. And there is a duty before starting a vehicle to see that
no child nearby is trespassing upon it. Ziehn v. Vale (1918) 98 Ohio St. 306, 12o
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N. E. 702; Ostrander v. Armour & Co. (igi6, 2d Dept.) 176 App. Div. 152, 161
N. Y. Supp. 961. But the owner or driver is not an insurer. Thus no liability
attaches where the child suddenly darts out and was not or could not have been
seen in time to stop the car. Hyde v. Hubinger (1913) 87 Conn. 704, 87 Atl. 790;
Sorsby v. Benninghoven (igi6) 82 Or. 345, 161 Pac. 251. In every case the duty
to anticipate depends on the circumstances. For the application of the doctrine 
of
contributory negligence to infants, see (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 684.
PLEADING--PRAYER FOR JUDGMENT-INcONSISTENCY BETWEEN CAUSE OF ACTION
AND RELIEF DEMANDED-EFFECT OF ANswER.-Officers of a corporation diverted
corporate funds for the payment of personal debts to the defendants, 
who had
notice of the diversion. The plaintiffs, trustees of the now bankrupt corporation,
sued the defendants and demanded an accounting. The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that equitable relief was demanded whereas
the facts showed only a legal cause of action. Held, that the motion be granted.
Chadbourne v. Ritz-Carlton Co. (1924, Sup. Ct.) 202 N. Y. Supp. 8o5.
Codes generally require that the complaint contain a prayer for judgment.
N. Y. C. P. A. sec. 255; Calif. C. C. P. 1915, sec. 426. A serious problem arises
where the relief demanded is inconsistent with the cause of action as made out
by the facts of the complaint. Where an "answer" has been interposed, relief is
granted consistent with the facts alleged and issue raised, regardless of the relief
demanded. Building Society v. Nakielski (igo6) 127 Wis. 539, lo6 N. W. 1O97;
Doctor v. Reiss (1917, 1st Dept.) I8o App. Div. 62, 167 N. Y. Supp. 193;
N. Y. C. P. A. sec. 479. Does a demurrer or a motion to dismiss constitute an
"answer" within the meaning of this rule? The difficulty is perhaps obviated
where the code uses the term "defense" instead of "answer." See Hansford v.
Holdam (1878, Ky.) 14 Bush. 21o; Ky. Rev. Codes, i9oo, sec. 90. And even
where "answer" is used, it may be construed to mean not "answer" strictu sensa,
but appearance, i. e. to include all cases except defaults. See Lane v. Gluckauf
(1865) 28 Calif. 288. The New York courts have been in conflict as to whether
"answer" under C. P. A. sec. 479 includes a motion in the nature of a demurrer.
Johnson v. Kelly (1874, N. Y. 2d Dept.) 2 Hun, 139 (held to include); Sims v.
Furson (1913, 3d Dept.) 157 App. Div. 38, 141 N. Y. Supp. 673 (same); Consoli-
dated Rubber Tire Co. v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. (19o9, 2d Dept.) 135
App. Div. 8o5, 12o N. Y. Supp. 128 (held not to include) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v.
International Ry. (1922, Spec. T.) 118 Misc. 227, 193 N. Y. Supp. 726 (same).
The court in the instant case has unfortunately adopted the strict technical view.
The plaintiff is thereby precluded from obtaining the relief to which he would have
been entitled if he had merely asked for general relief. The objection that the
court will not determine for the plaintiff what form of relief he may desire is
answered by authority, that where either a legal or equitable cause of action is
stated, but both legal and equitable relief are demanded, the demand for the inap-
propriate form of relief may be treated as surplusage. Mitchell v. Thorne (1892)
134 N. Y. 536, 32 N. E. io. Moreover, the intent of the codifiers of the New
York Code seems to have been to consider an appearance as constituting an
"answer" for this purpose. See First Report of the Conmissioners (1848) sec.
231, note. See also, for a. similar interpretation of "answer," judgment. statutes.
Ibid. sec. 202.
PROPERTY-INTEREST SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN TREsPAss-PowER OF REDEmP-
TION.-The plaintiff's vein of coal was forfeited to the state due to his failure 
to
enter it on the land books and to pax taxes. Before his power of redemption was
exercised, the defendant entered upon the land and carried away some coal. After
redemption, the plaintiff brought trespass. Held, that trespass might be main-
tained. Elk Garden Mining Co. v. Gerstell (1924, W. Va.) 121 S. E. 569.
It is generally said that to maintain trespass the plaintiff must have, at the time
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of the trespass, either actual possession or such legal "title" as gives "construc-
tive" possession. Newman v. Mountain Park Land Co. (19o8) 85 Ark. 2o8, 1O7
S. W. 391. It has been held, however, that the action will also lie at suit of an
equitable owner of unoccupied land provided he has an immediate right to posses-
sion. Russel v. Meyer (1898) 7 N. D. 335, 75 N. W. 262; Miller v. Zufall (1886)
113 Pa. 317, 6 At. 350. On the other hand, where the necessary title or posses-
sion is acquired subsequently to the trespass, the action will not lie. Knight v.
Empire Land Co. (1go8) 55 Fla. 301, 45 So. lO25. Thus a tenant may not recover
for a trespass committed before his tenancy commenced. Sposata; v. New York
(1904) 178 N. Y. 583, 70 N. E. iio9. But a disseisee may sue after re-entry for
a trespass committed during the possession of the disseisor, by use of the fiction
that his resumed possession has been continuous from the time of the disseisin.
Alliance Trust Co. v. Nettleton Hardwood Co. (I896) 74 Miss. 584, 21 So. 396.
A similar fiction is appealed to in the instant case. But the cases are distinguish-
able in that the plaintiff at the time of the trespass had only a power of redemption
and not an immediate right to possession. Although an action on the case seems
to be the more appropriate remedy, the decision reaches a just result, and may be
supported on the ground that the plaintiff's retention of that portion of the legal
"title" represented by the power of redemption is sufficient to give "constructive"
possession.
PROPERTY-SALE OF STANDING TIMBER-REmOvAL BY VENDEE AFTER STIPULATED
PaIOD.--The plaintiff sold standing timber on his land to the defendant, giving
him the right during five years from the date of sale to cut and remove the same.
The defendant entered after the five years had expired, cut, and carried timber
away. In an action for trespass the lower court sustained the defendant's plea of
no cause of action. Held, that the judgment be reversed, as title to the timber
not cut within the contract period reverted to the plaintiff. Ward v. Hayes-Ewell
Co. (1923, La.) 98 So. 740.
If no time limit is set, the timber must be removed within a reasonable time.
Polley v. Ford (i921) 190 Ky. 579, 227 S. W. 1007; Hill v. Vencill (1922)
go W. Va. 136, II, S. E. 478. Where a definite time limit has been set, all courts
agree in the statement that the intent of the parties determines the time when the
title passes, but in the absence of evidence of intent, different arbitrary rules are
used. Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Boykin (i98) io9 Tex. 276, 2o6 S. W. 815;
Furrow v. Bair (I919) 84 W. Va. 654, ioo S. E. 506. In a few jurisdictions it is
held that an absolute sale of the timber was contemplated, and that the vendee's
failure to remove in time gives rise merely to an action for breach of contract.
Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. Daffin (i9o6) 149 Ala. 380, 43 So. 858; Hanby v.
Dominick (192i) 2o6 Ala. 539, 90 So. 287;" see Monroe v. Bowen (1873) 26 Mich.
523. Damages do not then include the value of the trees. Hoit v. Stratton Mills
(1873) 54 N. H. io9. Other courts adopt the rule of the instant case that title
passes upon sale, subject to defeasance if the timber is not removed within the
agreed period. Kee v. Carver (192o) 95 Or. 406, x87 Pac. 1116; Harrington v.
Kneeland-Bigelow Co. (1921) 213 Mich. 327 182 N. W. 68. Others hold that
title does not pass until severance. Mallett v. Doherty (1919) i8o Calif. 225, I8o
Pac. 531; Maynard v. Farley (1923) 198 Ky. 42o, 248 S. W. 1022. It seems
that there is little practical difference between the legal consequences resulting
from the two latter views. It is thought, however, that the interest conveyed
might well be classified as a profit, giving the vendee an easement coupled with
the power of acquiring title by severance within the time set. See generally for
profits a prendre, 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1388; (1917) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 97. Replevin would lie under the rule that title passes upon sale,
where it would not lie, for interference with a profit. But under modem procedure
any damages recovered would seem to be identical with what could be gained in
trespass.
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SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-EFFEcr OF TRADE USAGE.-Pursuant to the plain-
tiff's request for Golden Yellow celery seed, the defendants furnished seed which
on maturity was found to be Green celery, a worthless variety. The plaintiff
alleged a warranty of the variety of the seed. The court refused the defendants'
request for an instruction that if there was a general custom of non-warranty
among dealers in California the plaintiff would be bound thereby, even if he did
not know of such custom. From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant
appealed. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the instruction should have been
granted. Miller v. Germain Seed Co. (1924, Calif.) 2 Pac. 817.
Descriptive statements import an unqualified warranty of the character or quality
of an article sold. Hoffman v. Dixon (igoo) 1O5 Wis. 315, 8I N. W. 491;
Newhall Land Co. v. Hogue-Kellogg Co. (1922) 56 Calif. App. 9o, 2o4 Pac. 562.
But the parties may by express stipulation rebut the inference of such a warranty.
Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co. (igii) 147 Wis. 166, 132 N. W. 9o2;
Kibbe v. Woodruff (Ig2o) 94 Conn. 443, lO9 Atl. 16g. Some jurisdictions have
refused to give to a general trade usage the same effect as an express stipulation.
Whitmore v. South Boston Iron Co. (I861, Mass.) 2 Allen, 52; Chicago Provision
Co. v. Tilton (1877) 87 Ill. 547. But the modem tendency is to permit a well-
defined usage to defeat a warranty which would otherwise exist. Blizzard Bros. v.
Growers Canning Co. (1911) 152 Iowa, 257, 132 N. W. 66; Ross v. Northrup,
King & Co. (1914) 156 Wis. 327, 144 N. W. II24; Seattle Seed Co. v. Fujimori
(94) 79 Wash. 123, 139 Pac. 866. Similarly, in the absence of descriptive state-
ments, a warranty may be established by a general usage. Sunner v. Tyson
(85o) 2o N. H. 384; Proctor v. Atlantic Fish Co. (ipn1) 2o8 Mass. 351, 94 N. E.
281. Here, too, earlier cases denied such effect to a usage. Dickinson v. Gay
(1863, Mass.) 7 Allen, 29; Thompson v. Ashton (1817, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 14 Johns.
316. That a trade usage may be recognized as one of the circumstances surround-
ing the making of a contract, it must be either known to both parties or so
notorious that actual knowledge is immaterial. Blizzard Bros. v. Growers Canning
Co., supra; Ross v. Northrup, King & Co., supra. Subject to these limitations,
the courts in measuring the seller's obligation, in warranty as in other matters,
might well give more attention to the bearing of circumstances on the meaning
of the acts and language of the parties at the time the contract is made.
SURETYSHIP-STATUTE OF FRAUDs-WRiTTEN PROMISE TO SIGN NoTE-The
plaintiff loaned money to the defendant's tenant at the defendant's request, taking
the note of the tenant which the defendant promised in writing to sign. The ten-
ant refused to pay, the defendant refused to sign, and the plaintiff sued both
for the amount of the note. The defendant pleaded the statute of frauds and
the lower court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, holding the defendant's
promise not within the statute. The defendant appealed. Held, (two judges
dissenting) that a new trial be ordered, since the question was one for the jury.
Farmer's Bank of Traveler's Rest v. Eledge (1923, S. C.) io S. E. 362.
In determining whether a promise is within the statute of frauds, there seems
no reason for a distinction between a promise to answer for, and a promise
to sign a note making one answerable for, the debt of another. See Carville v.
Crane (1843, N. Y. Sup. CL) 5 Hill, 483. The statute applies when the per-
son receiving the principal consideration is obligated, even though the credit
of the promisor is in fact exclusively relied on. Matson v. Wharam (1787,
K. B.) 2 T. R. 8o; Mankin v. Jones (19o8) 63 W. Va. 373, 6o S. E. 248;
Condon National Bank v. Cameron (1923, Or.) 216 Pac. 558. And it should
apply here, since the tenant signed the note. Otherwise where the "main pur-
pose" of the defendant's promise is to secure a direct benefit to himself.
Emerson v. Slater (1859, U. S.) 22 How. 28. But where the expected economic
benefit to a promisor is sufficiently great and direct, there is a tendency to say
that the main purpose of his promise is to serve his own interest, even
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though the effect of fulfilling the promise may be to discharge the debt of
another. Davis v. Patrick (i8gi) 141 U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct. 58; Housley v.
Strawn Merchandise Co. (1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. 673; Spencer, Surety-
ship (1913) sec. 69. But the mere fact that the surety received consideration
for his promise does not necessarily bring it within this rule. If it did, all
compensated suretyships would be outside the statute. White v. Rintoul (I888)
io8 N. Y. 222, I5 N. E. 318; Browne, Statute of Frauds (5th ed. I895) sec. 212;
Falconbridge, Guarantees and the Statute of Frauds (I92O) 68 U. PA. L.
REv. i, ibid. 137; but see Leonard v. Vredenburgh (I8ii, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8
Johns. 23. The directness of the expected benefit is, however, evidential of the
"main purpose" of making the promise. Gardner v. Jarrett (1922) 121 S. C.
338, 113 S. E. 493 (landlord's promise to stand good for advances made to a
share-cropper on his land held not within the statute) ; Gaines v. Durham (1923,
S. C.) 117 S. E. 732 (landlord's promise to pay for fertilizer used by a tenant
on his property held not within the statute). The benefit to the promisor in the
instant case seems sufficiently remote to keep the promise out of the "main
purpose" rule. Perry v. Jarman (i9i6) 125 Ark. 24o, 188 S. W. 544 (land-
lord's promise to pay for goods delivered to tenants); Hurst Co. v. Goodman
(igio) 68 W. Va. 462, 69 S. E. 898 (promise of an officer liable as indorser
on its paper to pay for goods sold to the corporation) ; Harburg Co. v. Martin
[19o2] i K B. 778. And this seems a question for the court rather than the
jury, since it is a matter of construing an undisputed agreement. Richardson
Press v. Albright (1918) 224 N. Y. 497, 121 N. E. 362. It seems indeed that
the judgment should have been affirmed in the instant case on the ground that the
written promise was a compliance with the statute. Spencer, Suretyship, op.
cit. supra, ch. 7.
TROVER-CoNVERSION OF GRAIN BY WAREHOUSEMAN-INNOCENT PURCHASER.-
The plaintiff was the assignee of warehouse receipts for grain stored in a ware-
house. The warehouse was subsequently emptied. Other grain was then deposited
and part was wrongfully sold by the warehouseman to the defendant, a bona fide
purchaser for value. In an action for conversion the lower court found for the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed on the ground that the plaintiff's interest in
the grain was not sufficient to support an action for conversion. Held, that the
plaintiff had a continuing claim on all grain of like kind and quality received on
account of purchase or general storage subsequent' to the deposit by the plaintiff's
assignors, in the proportion which plaintiff's receipts bore to the outstanding total.
Carson State Bank v. Grant Grain Co. (1924, N. D.) 197 N. W. 146.
An assignee of storage receipts becomes a tenant in common with other deposi-
tors of the mass in the warehouse, in the proportion which his receipts bear to the
whole. National Exchange Bank of Hartford v. Wilder (1885) 34 Minn. 149, 24
N. W. 699; Colebrook, Collateral Securities (1883) sec. 42o. If part of the mass
is lost or destroyed, the' depositors remain tenants in common of the residue in the
same proportion. Goodman v. Northcutt (1887) 14 Or. 529, 13 Pac. 485; Ramsey
v. Rodenburg (1923, Colo.) 212 Pac. 82o; (1872) 6 Am. L. REv. 467. When
there has been a wrongful sale by the warehouseman, depositors may sue him or
an innocent purchaser for conversion. Hall v. Pillsbury (189o) 43 Minn. 33, 44
N. W. 673; Kastner v. Andrews (1923, N. D.) 194 N. W. 824; Bowers, Law of
Conversion (917) 67. When a warehouseman wrongfully disposes of all the
grain in the warehouse and later deposits more himself, holders of previous receipts
may claim from these subsequent deposits. Eggers v. Hayes (1889) 40 Minn. 182,
41 N. W. 971; see Hall v. Pillsbuiy, supra. The bailor's claim evidently attaches
to the money derived from the wrongful sale, and thence to the grdin purchased
with that money, as long as it remains in the hands of the warehouseman. But in
the instant case the subsequent deposits were made by others than the warehouse-
man, so that the plaintiffs were never, in fact tenants in common of the mass of
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which the grain sold to the defendant was a part. Since the doctrine of prorating
is an incident to the actual confusion of goo~ls, it seems inapplicable to the facts in
the instant case where there was no such physical mixture. The grain elevator
industry would be greatly hampered if owners of grain should hesitate to utilize
elevators lest they be thus penalized for previous defaults of the warehouseman.
See Goodman v. Northcutt, supra.
TRUSTS-CoNSTRUCTIvE TRUSTS-PURcHASE OF REVERSION OF PARTNERSHIP
LEASE BY ONE PARTNER.-The plaintiff's partners secretly contracted to buy a
reversionary interest in premises held by the partnership under a lease, and sold the
contract at a profit. The plaintiff asked for an accounting. The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency. Held, that the motion be
denied. Mas v. Goldman and Malzmanr (1924, N. Y. Spec. T.) 122 Misc. 221.
When one partner takes a renewal of a partnership lease in his own name, he
holds it as constructive trustee for the partnership. Featherstonhaugh v. Femitrck
(18io, Ch.) 17 Ves. 298; Mitchell v. Reed (1874) 61 N. Y. 123. The reason given
in the older cases is that the second lease is a "graft on the old stock." Lee v.
Vernon (1776) 7 Brown's Par. Cas. 432. The holder of the first lease is con-
sidered to have an interest beyond the term arising out of the term--# "tenant
right of renewal." Holt v. Holt (167o) I Ch. Cas. i9o. And it has even been
held that a renewed lease was subject to a mortgage imposed on the first lease.
Knightly, Robinson v. Burdett (1686, Ch.) 2 Ver. io. But the English courts do
not extend the rule to the purchase of a reversion or additional lands unless there
is a contract or special custom of renewal with respect td them, since there is no
reversion expectant on a lease corresponding to a "tenant right of renewal."
Acheson v. Fair (1843, Ir. Ch.) 3 Dr. & War. 512; Bevan v. Webb [19o5] I Ch.
620; Lloyd Jones v. Clark-Lloyd [1919] I Ch. 424; see Anderson v. Lemon
(1853) 8 N. Y. 236. This distinction seems unsound since the chance of renewal,
cut off by procuring a lease, is equally imperiled by a purchase of the reversion.
See Griffith v. Owen [19o7] I Ch. 195 (tenant for life, who, by purchase from the
-mortgagee of the settled property destroyed the equity of redemption, held for
the benefit of the reversion) ; see Randall v. Russell (1817, Ch.) 3 Mer. i9o. The
real basis for imposing the trust in the lease cases is the rule that a fiduciary
shall not use the trust property nor his relation to it for his own advantage.
Keech v. Sandford (1726, Ch.) Sel. Cas. 61; see Trice v. Conmtock (1903,
C. C. A. 8th) 121 Fed. 62o. Good faith and absence of loss to the beneficiary are
immaterial. Magruder v. Drury (1914) 235 U. S. io6, 35 Sup. Ct. 77; see
(1915) 49 Am. L. REv. 6o7. To avoid the uncertain issue of fraud, the case is
treated, without admitting inquiry, as if the new lease was acquired by reason of
the fiduciary relationship. In re Biss [x9O3] 2 Ch. 4o; Turner v. Fryberger
(1905) 94 Minn. 433, io3 N. W. 217. But certain fiduciaries are allowed to show
that in spite of the relation there is nothing inequitable in their claiming the
renewed lease. This depends on the kind of fiduciary relationship. Magruder v.
Drury, supra (express trustee not allowed to show these facts) ; compare Sandy
River R. R. v. Stubbs (1885) 77 Me. 594 (directors of a corporation) ; see (1907)
7 CoL.. L. REv. 538. And some courts refuse to follow the rule to the extent of
forcing an unwelcome tenant upon a landlord. Jacksonville Cigar Co. v. Dozier
(907) 53 Fla. 1059, 43 So. 523. It seems that the instant case is in line with
sound principles of business fairness in applying these rules to reversions as well
as to leases.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC AND CoMPErIToRS-REISsUING
OLD PHOTOPLAYS UNDER NEW TnLEs.-The petitioner, a producer of photoplays,
reissued three old productions under new titles. Under 'authority of the Act of
September 26, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 717) the Federal Trade Commission declared
such practice unfair and forbade further reissues unless the fact of the prior issue
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and the old titles be definitely stated. Held, that the Commission's order be
affirmed. Fox Film Corporation v. Federal Trade Comirsion (1924, C. C. A.
2d) 296 Fed. 353.
To sell or advertise goods under a misleading appearance or title may injure
the public and competitors-the public by deception, the competitor by reducing the
demand for his particular goods. The injury to the latter may result from (a) a
filling of the demand for his particular brand of goods, or (b) bringing such
brand of goods into disrepute, (c) filling the demand for his kind or quality of
goods, or (d) bringing such kind or quality of goods into disrepute. State legis-
lation prohibiting misleading selling or advertising resulting in these abuses is
generally upheld as a constitutional exercise of the police power. Armour & Co.
v. North Dakota (1916) 240 U. S. "5io, 36 Sup. Ct. 44o; Freund, Police Power
(19o4) sec. 272; (1917) 26 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 416. In the absence of such
legislation the public is protected to some extent by the remedies of the injured
competitor, as to practices covered by (a) and (b) supra. O'Sullivan Rubber Co.
v. Genuine Rubber Co. (1922, C. C. A. Ist) 279 Fed. 972 (injuncti6n); Coco-Cola
Co. v. Vivian Ice, Light & Water Co. (1922) 15o La. 445, 90 So. 755 (injunction,
accounting and damages); Oliphant, Cases on Trade Regulation (1923) 354;
Nims, UrJair Competition and Trade Marks (2d ed. 1917) 79, 233. The tendency
of the courts is to give relief even where only a slight loss is shown. One of the
major factors inducing the decisions in such cases seems to be the indirect protec-
tion thereby given to the public. Lampert ,. Judge Co. (1911) 238 Mo. 409, 141
S. W. io95 (one cent compensatory damages and $500 punitive damages); see
Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co. (1918, C. C. A. 2d) 250 Fed. 96o.
As to practices covered by (c) and (d) supra, the inability of any single competi-
tor to show sufficiently direct injury through their use, had as a liractical matter
made offending merchants immune from court action. Anwrican Washboard Co.
v. Saginaw Mfg. Co. (igoo, C. C. A. 6th) 1O3 Fed. 281. The principal case is in
line with other recent cases and illustrates the effectiveness of the Federal Trade
Act in meeting this evil by putting new content in the term "unfair methods of
competition" as used in the Act. See also Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 281 Fed. 744; Federal Trade Comnission
v. Winsted Hosiery Co. (1922) 258 U. S. 483, 42 Sup. Ct. 384-
VERDIcTs-DAMAGES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-NEw TRiAL ON QUESTION OF
DAMAGES ONLY.-In a personal injury action the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff of $5,ooo. A statute provided that if the award of damages was
excessive or inadequate, a new trial could be ordered limited to the question of
damages. The defendant objected to a retrial on the question of damages only,
contending that the statute was unconstitutional in that it deprived him of a
right to have the questions of liability and damages determined by the same
jury. Held, that the statute was constitutional. Robinson v. Payne (1923, N. J.)
122 At. 882.
The weight of authority is to the effect that the court has the inherent power
at common law to limit the new trial to the single issue of damages. Clark
v. N. Y. N. H.-& H. R. R. (1911) 33 R. I. 83, 8o Atl. 4o6; Simnons v. Fish
(I912) 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. lO2; contra: Cerney v. Paxton and Gallagher
Co. (19o8) 83 Neb. 88, 119 N. W. 14; see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *387.
In some states the trial court may, as a condition of refusing a motion for a new
trial, require the plaintiff to remit the sum deemed excessive, thus avoiding
the cost and delay of a new trial. Arkansas Valley Land Co. v. Mann (1889) 13o
U. S. 69, 9 Sup. Ct. 458; Devine v. St. Louis (1914) 257 Mo. 470, 165 S. W. 1014;
Henderson v. Dreyfus (1919) 26 N. M. 541, 191 Pac. 442; contra: Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Randolph (19o8) 129 Ga. 796, 59 S. E. iiio. See Ford v.
Minneapolis Ry. (1go6) 98 Minn. 96, io7 N. W. 8,7 (unusual practise of com-
pelling defendant to consent to an increase of the verdict as a condition of refus-
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ing to grant plaintiff's motion for a new trial). Otherwise if the verdict was
the result of passion or prejudice. Drumm v. Cessnun (1897) 58 Kan. 331,
49 Pac. 78; Tunnel Mining Co. v. Cooper (Ig9i) 5o Colo. 390, 1I5 Pac. 901;
contra: Goss v. Goss (1907)- O2 Minn. 346, 113 N. W. 69o. And an appellate
court may affirm the judgment of the lower court on the plaintiff's consenting
to remit. Burdict v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (1894) 123 Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453; contra:
Watt v. Watt (i9o5, H. L.) 21 T. L. R. 386. The plaintiff has even been compelled
to remit. Rice v. Crescent City Ry. (1899) 51 La. Ann. 1o8, 24 So. 791 (no
state constitutional provision as to jury trials in civil cases). This practise,
however, has been held to violate the seventh amendment of the Federal consti-
tution. Kennon v. Gihner (1889) 131 U. S. 22, 9 Sup. Ct. 696; cf. Wichita
& Colorado Ry. v. Gibbs (18gi) 47 Kan. 274, 27 Pac. 991 (plaintiff's evidence
on its face indicated that the verdict was excessive). A recent federal case
has further held that the procedure authorized by the New Jersey statute also
violates the amendment. McKeon v. Central Stamping Co. (192o, C. C. A. 3d)
264 Fed. 385. But the same type of statute has been upheld in a state court as
against a similar provision of the state constitution. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Scott
(1914) io8 Miss. 871, 67 So. 49i; see Powell v. Augusta & Summerville R. R.
(1887) 77 Ga. 192, 3 S. E. 757; (1920) 91 CENT. L. JouR. 79. It seems that the
latter represents the better view, since a fair jury trial is had on the issues both
of liability and damages. That the new trial shodld cover both issues, although a
fair trial has already been had on the issue of liability, seems more than is required
by the constitutional right. The instant case-is therefore sound.
Wni.S-HoLoaAPHIc WILus.-On the day of his death, the deceased had
written a letter to his two sons, discussing several matters and closing with the
statement that he had some valuable papers which he wished them to keep so that
if "enny thing hapens" they would get his property. The letter was signed
"Father." An appeal was taken from a decree directing probate of this letter.
Held, that the decree be affirmed, since the letter exhibited a testamentary intent
and was properly signed. In re Kiininel's Estate (1924, Pa.) 123 Atl. 405.
Under the Statute of Frauds the ecclesiastical courts admitted practically any
dispositive writing as a will of personal property. See Ross v. E-wer (1744, Ch.)
3 Atk. 139. Any mark was sufficient as a signature if it had been made with the
intent to authenticate the writing. Baker v. Dening (1838, Q. B.) 8 Ad. & El. 94.
A testamentary intent was the only requirement. See Waller v. Waller (1845,
Va.) i Gratt. 454; I Sbhouler, Wills (6th ed. 1923) secs. 336, 389. If the charac-
ter of the paper was doubtful on its face, only a readily rebuttable presumption
that the intent was lacking was raised. See Watts v. Public Administrator (1829,
N. Y.) i Paige Ch. 347; Thorncroft v. LAshmnar (1862, P.) 2 Swab. & Tr. 479.
To remedy the mischiefs resulting from this laxity of construction, statutes
imposed on wills of personalty the same requirements of execution and attestation
as for wills of realty. See (1837) 7 Will. IV & i Vict. c. 26; In re Swire's
Estate (1909) 225 Pa. 188, 73 Atl. IIIO. But some of these statutes excepted
holographic wills. See Wills Act, Pa. Laws, 1917, 403; Pa. Sts. I92O, sec. 8308.
Practically any paper, if entirely in the handwriting, of the testator, signed and
executed with testamentary intent, could still be probated. Knox's Estate (18go)
131 Pa. 22o, 18 Atl. 1021. But even under these principles, the instant case goes
to the extreme of finding a testamentary intent in a letter equivocal on its face.
Cf. McBride v. McBride (1875, Va.) 26 Gratt. 476. And the holding that
"Father" is a sufficient signature is difficult to reconcile with a previous decision
by the Pennsylvania court to the contrary. See In re Brennan's Estate (1914).
244 Pa. 574, 91 At. 220; Selby v. Selby (1817, Ch.) 3 Mer. 2. Such difficulties
are eliminated by requiring the formality of attestation. i Schouler, op. cit. secs.
335, 355, 390. Such informal wills as in the instant case override all safeguards
against fraud provided by the formal requirements of the Wills Act. See (1922)
9 VA. L. Rv. 72.
